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INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appe11ant Gino Montoya regies on his opening
brief and replies a~- follow-,.ei.
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discussion.

SUMMARY OE THE ARGUMEM "T"
The issue presented i n this case i s not whether Montoya
shoul d have been incarcerated ox given probation

.imposing consecutive sentences,

.nstead, the

Tnis issue requires

consideration of different factors than the probationdemonstrate tt •' \.n-

ria: rear*, ab^sec it? aiscre: :c

i

imposing consecutiv*= sentences.
"Ti l i s

• :

year firearm enhancements
is required in this case.

.

i.

rie State agrees tha: ^-icn
Addition?1.1.1-

issued a decision after Appe^iat: :.

-----

a remand

- ne Utah .°uDreme Court

. ;_s briei ,v:A::n mandates

such a remand.

See State v. Higcrinbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551

(Utah 1996) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
The trial judge acknowledged at sentencing that the
sentence she imposed was "more lengthy than many homicides."
R. 32 9.

Gino's sentence, as it now stands, exceeds the sentence

imposed in many homicides as well as other crimes where
individuals are seriously injured.

While punishment is certainly

appropriate, the issue in this case is whether the imposition of
consecutive sentences was excessive and an abuse of discretion
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2), not whether Gino should have
been given probation rather than incarceration.
In its brief, the State appears to confuse the question
of incarceration versus probation with the consecutive sentencing
issue presented in this case.

For instance, the State argues

that Montoya's "severe learning and cognitive deficits" "might be
relevant if he had identified a particular program that could
address his mental impairments better than prison, but he has not
done so."

State's brief at 21.

Obviously, "identifying a

particular program that could address [Montoya's] mental
impairments better than prison" would relate to the question of
whether Montoya should have been placed on probation.

Montoya is

not arguing that he should have been placed on probation; the
2

claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive sentences.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2), the trial court
must consider a defendant's rehabilitative needs in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.

Montoya has special

rehabilitative needs which have not been recognized or met in the
past.

The fact that he has positive personality traits which

suggest that he is amenable to treatment if such treatment takes
into account his deficits weighs in favor of concurrent
sentences.
Individuals with learning and cognitive deficits present
"quite challenging" and "difficult" treatment or educational
situations.

This does not mean they are hopeless and should not

be given the opportunity for treatment or education.

Nor does it

mean that they should be given consecutive sentences.

In Gino's

case, his special needs demonstrate an explanation for some of
his past behavior and a reason for sentencing him concurrently.
Mental health professionals have not "gotten close" to
Gino, as suggested by the State.

State's brief at 23.

The State

selects out of context some of the words included in the
presentence report.

R. 26a.

The presentence investigator was

actually referring to a March 1991 psychological evaluation done
under court order.

R. 26a.

Such an evaluation hardly presents a

situation where Gino and a mental health professional have
"gotten close."

Further, the investigator's hearsay depiction of

3

that evaluation1 is not nearly as negative as the State paints
it.
The presentence report's depiction of the Long evaluation
from which the State lifted the negative words listed on page 23
of its brief actually points out that
the defendant's upbringing and home environment
were noted as being the most significant factors
to account for his criminal behavior. The
defendant grew up in an anti-social environment
and is very aggressive as a result. Dr. Long
found the defendant to be functioning within a
dull to normal range of intellectual ability with
an IQ score of 81. Difficulty in thinking and
concentrating were noted coupled with
resentfulness, hostility, and aggressiveness.
In his personality description, Dr. Long
states "he is unable to express his feelings in a
modulated fashion; feelings are either bottled up
or expressed by acting out. His judgement is
impaired and he fails to profit from experience."
The problems are compounded by the defendant's
abusive use of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine,
according to Dr. Long. "He is anxious and
pessimistic, apathetic and emotionally inhibited
and controlled. He becomes maladaptive under
stress and becomes confused and disorganized. He
is easily excited and often becomes emotional.
He is argumentative, sarcastic, self-indulgent,
shrewd, and deceitful; he has a plethora of
problems." The diagnostic impression provided in
1991 was Axis I: Borderline intellectual
functioning, alcohol, cannabis, cocaine abuse;
and Axis II: Anti-social personality disorder.
As recommended by Dr. Long many of the
defendant's problems could be lessened if not
eliminated were he able to withdraw himself from
his gang lifestyle and put forth a modicum of
effort. Unfortunately, the defendant has proven
unwilling to make any such long term effort to
date.
i

The presentence investigator may well have taken the same
approach as the State did in its brief, and selected bits and
pieces of Dr. Long's report out of context, thereby changing the
impact of such report.
4

R. 26a (emphasis added).
The State lists all of the charges ever filed against
Montoya, regardless of outcome.

State's brief at 9-10.

Presumably, the State's point is that Montoya's record supports
the consecutive sentences.

Many of the charges, however, were

dismissed for a variety of reasons.

Basing a consecutive

sentence on charges dismissed in another case is not an
acceptable or reliable method for sentencing a defendant.

See

State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993) (sentence must be
based on reliable information).
Additionally, the State seems to suggest that because
Montoya entered into a plea bargain, the consecutive sentences
were appropriate.

State's brief at 16, 19.

The State argues

that Montoya was charged with twelve first degree minimum
mandatories and that such charges coupled with the firearm
enhancements would result "in possible consecutive sentences of
between 72 and 192 years without possibility of parole."
brief at 19.

State's

The State's point, apparently, is that since

Montoya bargained away the minimum mandatory sentences,
consecutive sentences were permissible to make up for the State's
loss in the bargain.

The charges, however, and their potential

aggregate sentence is irrelevant to the statutorily outlined
considerations for imposing consecutive sentences.
Plea bargains are entered into for a variety of reasons
which are not always apparent from the record on appeal.
to the original charges to determine whether to uphold
5
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consecutive sentences is inappropriate where those charges have
been bargained away.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that if Montoya
had pled guilty to or been convicted of the twelve minimum
mandatory charges and been sentenced consecutively to "between 72
and 192 years without possibility of parole," such sentences
would not have held up under State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah
1993), and State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995).
As pointed out by Appellant in his opening brief at 31,
if Strunk and Smith are limited to consecutive sentences imposed
on minimum mandatory charges, an inequity in the imposition of
consecutive sentences will exist.

In some cases, defendants

would be better off pleading to minimum mandatory charges in
order to avoid the potential of consecutive sentences.

For

example, in Gino's case, had he pled guilty to six minimum
mandatory charges rather than the six lesser counts to which he
pled, Montoya could not have been sentenced consecutively
pursuant to Strunk and Smith.
Finally, it is important to note that all of the charges
in this case arose from the use of a single gun during an
impulsive episode.

Gino was confused and scared and carried away

by that fear and confusion.
investigator:

As Gino told the presentence

"My mom had told me that the gang unit officers

had been to her home about six times looking for me and that they
would kill me if I ran.

So, I was scared.

wanted and that they would shoot me."
6

I felt that I was

R. 6a.

When Gino stopped

to reflect on what had occurred, he gave himself up.
Based on the use of that single gun during an ongoing,
impulsive, unplanned act, the State filed an Amended Information
containing sixteen counts.

Most of those counts relied on the

use of that single gun to reach an "aggravated" status or to
define the elements of the crime.

Additionally, the firearm

enhancements all relied on the single use of that gun.
pled guilty to six counts.

Montoya

Two of those counts in addition to

the three firearm enhancements relied on that single use of the
gun.

The charges to which Montoya pled guilty along with the

firearm enhancements already had taken into account the gravity
of this crime, and had already been enhanced or aggravated based
on the use of the gun.
The issue of consecutive versus concurrent sentences is
important to individuals such as Gino Montoya who are facing the
possibility of lengthy incarceration.

Consecutive sentences can

be in essence sentences of life without possibility of parole.
Such sentences can take away incentive to advance in levels at
the prison, obtain further education, participate in programs,
work towards parole, or otherwise assume a positive attitude.

In

this case where the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences, the case should be remanded for
resentencing.

POINT II. THIS CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR
CORRECTION OF THE THREE-YEAR FIREARM
ENHANCEMENTS.
7

The State concedes in its brief that the trial judge
improperly imposed three firearm enhancements of three years
each.

State's brief at 27-28.

The State agrees that this case

must be remanded for correction of firearm enhancements.

State's

brief at 28.
Additionally, after Appellant filed his brief in this
case, the Utah Supreme Court issued a decision which directly
controls this issue.

See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551.2

In

Higginbotham, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in imposing two consecutive two-year firearm enhancements.
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551.

The Court reasoned that Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-203(1) "does not authorize a consecutive,
determinable two year term . . . ."
551.

Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at

Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded Higginbotham for

"correction of the illegal two-year sentence enhancement."

Id.

As set forth in both Appellant's and Appellee's briefs,
and as required by the recent Utah Supreme Court decision in
Higginbotham, this case must be remanded for correction of the
illegal sentence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Montoya respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the consecutive sentence and

The State did not cite Higginbotham in its brief.
8

weapon enhancement order and remand the case for resentencing.

SUBMITTED this I3LJJL day of September, 1996.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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